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Abstract 
In cognitive neuroscience the sense of agency is 
defined as the as the experience of controlling one’s 
own actions and, through this control, affecting the 
external world. At CHI 2012 I presented a paper 
entitled “I did that! Measuring Users’ Experience of 
Agency in their own Actions” [1]. This extended 
abstract draws heavily on that paper, which described 
an implicit measure called intentional binding. This 
measure, developed by researchers in cognitive 
neuroscience, has been shown to provide a robust 
implicit measure for the sense of agency. My interest in 
intentional binding stemmed from prior HCI literature, 
(e.g. the work of Shneiderman) which emphasises the 
importance of the sense of control in human-computer 
interactions. The key question behind the CHI 2012 
paper was: can we apply intention binding to provide 
an implicit measure for the experience of control in 
human-computer interactions? In investigating this 
question, replication was a key element of the 
experimental process. 
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Intentional Binding 
Repeated experiments have shown that voluntary 
human actions are associated with systematic changes 
in our perception of time [3]. The interval between a 
voluntary or intentional action and the outcome of such 
an actions is typically perceived as shorter than the 
actual interval. For example, if a person voluntarily 
presses a button and this action causes an outcome - 
e.g. a beep - it is highly likely that the person will 
perceive their action as having happened later than 
they it actually did (action binding). They are also likely 
to perceive the outcome as having happened earlier 
than it actually did (outcome binding). Patrick Haggard, 
the research who first identified this phenomenon, 
coined the term ‘Intentional Binding’ to describe it, as it 
is contingent on several factors [3]. In the absence of 
outcomes people are found to more accurately report 
the timing of actions. For the temporal binding effect to 
occur, actions must be intentional and must lead to an 
outcome. Under these conditions our perception of the 
timings of actions and their outcomes become bound 
together temporally. 
In the years since Haggard’s first experiments, a large 
number of studies have validated and built on his initial 
observations. In and of itself this repeated 
experimentation highlights the importance of replication 
in cognitive neuroscience research. Based on this 
replication, a scientific consensus is now supports the 
conclusion that time perception in voluntary actions - 
and the binding effects associated with such actions - 
provides a robust implicit metric for the sense of 
agency. Higher intentional binding values correlate to a 
greater sense of personal agency. 
Replication and application 
Detailed descriptions of the experimental methods used 
to assess intentional binding are beyond the scope of 
this short paper. These details are available in the CHI 
2012 paper [1]. Instead I will focus more broadly on 
the ways in which we replicated prior experiments and 
applied this metric. 
Experiment 1 
Neuro-cognitive experiments on intention binding 
typically focus on very simple interactions, e.g. a 
button press that causes a beep. My first experiment 
focused on the modality of the interaction. It asked if 
changes in the modality of an interaction lead to 
changes in the sense of agency. The experimental 
design closely mirrored procedures originally outlined 
by Haggard. One independent variable was 
manipulated: the input modality. We compared a 
traditional input device - a keypad - with a skin-based 
input device. The keypad replicated the input typically 
used in neuroscience research. In condition one the 
participant pressed a button on a keypad to cause a 
beep. In condition two - the skin-based condition - the 
participant caused a beep by tapping on their arm. The 
skin-based capture device was attached to the 
participant’s left arm and they tapped this arm with 
their right hand. In all cases there was a fixed interval 
of 250ms between the participant’s action and the 
beep. 
Results showed that users experienced significantly 
higher intentional binding for skin-based interactions. 
Across 19 participants a mean binding of 42.92ms was 
observed in the button press condition. I.e. an interval 
of 250ms was perceived as 207.08ms. Importantly, this 
binding value is consistent with the results of prior 
  
binding experiments that have used button inputs. In 
the skin-based condition participants experienced a 
total binding effect of 109.47ms. Here 250ms was 
perceived as 140.53ms. Given the correlation between 
intentional binding and the sense of agency, this 
experiment suggests that people experience a 
significantly greater sense of agency, or control, when 
they interact with technology via skin-based input, as 
compared with traditional keypad input. 
More broadly speaking, this experiment provided 
empirical evidence that different interaction modalities 
can provide different experiences of control and 
ownership. In undertaking this experiment I believe it 
was essential that one of our input conditions - the 
keypad - replicated prior cognitive neuroscience 
research. This replication demonstrates that our 
experiment was administered effectively and lends 
strength and credibility to our findings. It also allows 
our results to be judged against and incorporated into 
the prior body neuro-cognitive research on intentional 
binding and the sense of agency. 
Ultimately I hope the method we introduced can be 
used to investigate the sense of agency across a wide 
range of input modalities. For other researchers using 
this technique, I strongly recommend that replication 
(plus extension) of prior results again be a key element 
in the design of new experiments.  
Experiment 2 
Cognitive neuroscience experiments on intentional 
binding have typically examined voluntary and 
involuntary actions. From an HCI perspective, this 
might be considered an unnecessarily black or white 
disjunction. Many user interactions with technology are 
more intermediate. In particular ‘intelligent’ user 
interfaces often seek to interpret and act on the 
intentions of the user. Here users’ actions are 
voluntary, but the outcomes may be assisted. The 
second experiment in the CHI 2012 paper was designed 
to investigate users’ sense of agency in interactions 
where a computer interprets their intention and helps 
them to achieve a goal. In this sense the second 
experiment diverged further for the interactions 
examined in prior cognitive neuroscience research. 
However, as in first experiment, we apply an 
experimental procedure that closely matched prior 
literature.  
The experiment investigated agency in a machine-
assisted point-and-click task. Using a mouse, 
participants were required to hit targets on a computer 
screen, as quickly and as accurately as possible. The 
computer provided assistance through an algorithm 
that effectively added gravity to targets, thereby 
making it easier for participants to complete the task. 
Hitting a target caused a beep. In each trial there was a 
random interval between hitting a target and the beep, 
and participants were asked to estimate this interval.  
In the experiment we investigated four different 
assistance levels, which varied from no assistance to a 
very high, and very obvious, level of computer 
assistance. Results suggested that, up to a certain 
point, the computer could assist users whilst also 
allowing them to retain a sense of agency for their 
actions. However, we found that beyond a certain level 
of assistance users experienced a detectable loss in 
their sense of agency. This loss in agency occurred in 
spite of the fact that the computer correctly interpreted 
  
users’ intentions and assisted them in achieving their 
goal.  
Our results suggest that for the assisted input 
algorithm we investigated - and possibly for assisted 
input systems more generally - there may exist a 
tipping point or sweet spot. This is the point at which a 
computer can help people and potentially maximise 
task performance - e.g. speed or accuracy - without 
significant detriment to the experience of agency. I find 
this possibility very intriguing. However I also believe 
further investigation, and further replication, is required 
to assess the generalizability of our initial finding. I am 
currently undertaking such research. 
Conclusions 
Alongside the issues discussed above, I have one minor 
comment on the CHI submission process. When I 
submitted the original CHI 2012 paper, I was very keen 
to also submit the dataset for my studies. Under the 
2012 submission system this was not possible. I 
understand that this issue was addressed for CHI 2013 
submissions. This was a real step forward.  
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